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PACIFIC WAR NOT JUST "AN AMERICAN SHOW"

IN the brief period since Germany's unconditional surrender Washington has been making every effort to drive home the facts about the war with Japan. It is now clear that, despite the loss of all its allies, Tokyo has the power to resist for a considerable period and to exact a great toll of the United Nations before going down in defeat. Unquestionably the strategy of concentrating first of all on the defeat of the Nazis has been proved correct, for we have achieved victory in Europe, while successfully carrying forward the struggle in Asia. In the process the Japanese have lost a large part of their fleet, millions of tons of merchant shipping, and control over a large portion of the Pacific. Serious blows also have been inflicted on their air force, and many divisions of their troops have been destroyed or bypassed. But the United Nations have not been able to undertake a land offensive against hundreds of thousands or millions of enemy soldiers at one time.

A COALITION WAR. Nowhere in the Far East do the armies fighting Japan possess bases as powerful or as favorably located as were the British Isles and Russia in the war with Germany. In driving toward Tokyo the brunt of the offensive plainly will have to be borne by the United States. Yet on this road, too, we are marching together with allies whose aid will continue to be essential. The Chinese, both in the Central armies and in the Communist-led Eighth Route and New Fourth armies, have tied down hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops. The Americans fighting on Okinawa also have Australian friends on the blood and oil-soaked ground of Tarakan, and British and Indian allies in Burma. These facts should be remembered when next we hear that the Pacific war is "an American show" and that we are able to lick the Japanese single-handed.

Apart from the development of America's own efforts in the Far East, nothing is more important than

to transform the war against Japan into a fully developed coalition enterprise. One great stride in this direction was made at the Quebec Conference last September when, despite the opposition of some American circles, it was agreed that the British Navy should participate in the Pacific on a large scale. The results are already evident at Okinawa, for several of Britain's finest carriers have carried out supporting operations near-by. In general, every British ship or division transferred to the Far East, every Chinese division added to the ranks of those fighting effectively, every guerrilla unit enabled to carry on more widespread anti-Japanese warfare—whether in China, Indo-China or the Philippines—will represent a contribution toward shortening the struggle ahead. To some it may seem easier to wage a single-handed, isolationist war than to work with old allies and seek out new ones, but the ultimate cost in blood and international friction is likely to be far greater than under a policy of cooperation.

POLITICS AND STRATEGY. The military strategy of utilizing every opportunity for coalition warfare against Japan has profound political implications. It means that we must leave no stone unturned in the effort to develop fruitful contacts with the Chinese guerrilla forces under Yen-an, as well as with the armies under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, and that the establishment of genuine Chinese unity is now more essential than ever. It means, also, that sound policies must be developed toward the peoples of colonial Asia, who in the past have seemed politically inert, but have been stirred up in unprecedented fashion by the events of recent years. The fact that guerrilla resistance movements have appeared not only in the Philippines but also in Indo-China and Burma is a token of wartime changes. If maximum military aid is to be drawn from the colonial peoples now under Japan's heel, it will be neces-

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sary to appeal to the nationalist aspirations that are growing among them. And it will not be enough for the United States to confine its interest in dependent areas to the acquisition of strategic bases.

A crucial factor in speeding Japan's defeat will be the maintenance and development of close relations with Russia. As a result of its role in the defeat of Germany and the diversionary effect of Soviet divisions stationed in the Far East, the U.S.S.R. has already made a significant contribution to the defeat of Japan. It now lies in the power of the Russians to extend further aid in the form of bases, supplies or possibly troops. But one inescapable prerequisite for such aid is that, in the occupation of Germany and the restoration of liberated Europe, the Big Three remain united. It is hardly necessary to emphasize that, in their present difficulties, the Japanese are pinning their hopes on a break-up of the Big Three. The amicable settlement of leading European issues can have a great deal to do with the winning of the earliest possible victory over Japan.

TRUSTEESHIP FORMULA SOUGHT AT SAN FRANCISCO

SAN FRANCISCO. — The termination of hostilities in Europe, far from distracting the Conference from its tasks, has caused it to pursue them at a grueling pace, so that the representatives of Britain and the European countries can return home as soon as possible. The post-war problems which the machinery here being evolved is designed to settle overshadow the conference table. While an earnest effort is being made to keep specific political and economic issues out of the discussions, it is impossible to talk of trusteeships without thinking about the disposition of Italy's colonies in Africa and its strategic islands in the Mediterranean (not to speak of the Japanese mandated islands); or to weigh the merits of bilateral and regional security pacts without wondering what measures the Allies plan to take to prevent Germany's military resurgence in the future.

The two most noticeable undercurrents in the Conference are the determination of the Big Five to reach an agreement on amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals which would meet the reservations and criticisms expressed by the "middle" and small nations; and, at the same time, a strong trend to put a check on Russia's aspirations in Europe and Asia—to demarcate the line beyond which a victorious Russia should not be allowed to go. Now that military victory has been achieved, both Britain and the United States show less disposition than during the war years to placate Moscow. Yet if there is one point on which there is a consensus it is that the Russians have proved very cooperative, in spite of the initial flare-up about Argentina and the shock caused by Molotov's announcement of the arrest of the sixteen Poles. The Soviet delegation has been as

DEFINING UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER. It is impossible to say whether Japan will yield short of utter defeat. But an effective Allied policy to prevent the resurgence of Germany might encourage this result. If Tokyo sees that Germany's prolonged struggle has produced no loophole through which the Germans can escape the consequences of aggression, the Japanese may consider it advantageous to avoid the thoroughgoing destruction that invasion of their homeland would bring. In any event, the Japanese would be strengthened in their hope for a negotiated peace if we were to commit the error of defining unconditional surrender by making detailed promises to them. To assure the Japanese, as President Truman did in a special message on May 8, that "unconditional surrender does not mean the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese people," is sound and truthful policy, but we cannot offer them an easy future after their years of aggression.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

earnestly absorbed in the work of the Conference as any other.

RUSSIA ASSUMES LEADERSHIP. Mr. Molotov, on the eve of his departure for Moscow, skillfully placed Russia in the vanguard of nations that demand protection of human rights (among which he placed the right to work, with a broad hint at the prospect of post-war unemployment), and emphasized the need for furthering the welfare and independence of colonial peoples. If these issues could be discussed in a public forum, instead of mass press conferences, the question might be raised whether Russia itself is not a colonial power, controlling dependent peoples in Europe and Asia, and thus subject to the application of the high standards of human rights it is urging on the Western nations. The fact remains, however, that the leadership in urging colonial reforms that could have been taken by Britain and the United States has been asserted by Russia, which has thereby won the support of several countries in the forefront of social progress, notably New Zealand; while Canada has taken the lead in presenting a well-thought-out project for the organization of the Economic and Social Council. The presence of Russia at this Conference has unquestionably had an impact on the thinking of other delegations; at the same time there is no doubt that the Russians, for their part, have learned much from their contacts here. The discussion of mutual problems between Russia and the Western nations is perhaps one of the most important results of the Conference.

EMPHASIS ON SECURITY. In this discussion, which goes on practically twenty-four hours a day

in committee rooms, at meals, in elevators and on buses, the chief problem raised is how to reconcile the almost primitive desire of every nation for security with the need, so brutally revealed by the war, for some form of collective security system. When Russia, France, and the countries of Eastern Europe demand the retention of bilateral security pacts, their thoughts are dominated by their tragic experience of German (and in some cases also Italian) aggression. When the Latin American countries, with equal vehemence, insist on a priority rating for the Act of Chapultepec, they are stirred by fear of intervention in this hemisphere by a non-American power—and as a result, paradoxical as it may seem, have become even more fervent advocates of the Monroe Doctrine than the United States. When this country, in turn, presents a trusteeship proposal which is intended first of all to assure our security in the Pacific by a formula that represents a compromise between outright annexation (advocated by the Army and Navy) and the Atlantic Charter (favored by public opinion), it is endeavoring to build a rampart against future Japanese aggression. But our efforts to insure our own security make it increasingly difficult for us to question the determination of Britain, France, Holland and Belgium to retain their colonial possessions, which for them represent factors of power in the post-war world.

NEED FOR TRANSITIONAL SYSTEM. The most that can be hoped for in this period of tumultuous transition from war to peace is that the Conference will succeed in establishing a transitional system of international organization, whose charter can be amended with relative ease to conform to conditions now unforeseen and unforeseeable. This will in itself be a major achievement—even if the charter is no more than our Articles of Confederation. For then a breathing-space will have been won in which to forge a more perfect union.

For a clear, brief survey of the achievements of the Mexico City Conference, and the texts of the Act of Chapultepec and the Economic Charter of the Americas, read—

THE MEXICO CITY CONFERENCE AND REGIONAL SECURITY by Olive Holmes

25¢

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Such union, however, will not prove lasting unless it is built to meet the needs and spirit of our times. Here one can see clearly the gap that has developed between the new forces that are stirring in Europe—most strikingly represented in the French delegation, which contains many members of the resistance movement, beginning with Foreign Minister Bidault—and the countries physically untouched by war, like those of Latin America. The New World seems old, and potentially or actually reactionary as compared with the Old World of Europe. It is among those who have gone through the hell of war and Nazi terrorism that one feels a promise for the future. This promise must be reflected in the charter if the UNCIO is to grip the imagination of war-tired peoples.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

THE F.P.A. BOOKSHELF

Pope Pius XII, by Kees Van Hoek. New York, Philosophical Library, 1945. \$2.00

Interesting, brief biography by a Catholic journalist.

In the Margins of Chaos: Recollections of Relief Work In and Between Three Wars, by Francesca M. Wilson. New York, Macmillan, 1945. \$3.00

Written with warmth and understanding by one who did relief work, largely for the Friends, in different parts of Europe and Africa.

Timeless Mexico, by Hudson Strode. New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1944. \$3.50

Vivid, dramatically written history of Mexico.

Russia Is No Riddle, by Edmund Stevens. New York, Greenberg, 1945. \$3.00

A friendly but candid appraisal of the temper and policies of Russia in wartime, by the Moscow correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor* who is well acquainted with the country and the people.

Hope for Peace at San Francisco? What Catholics Should Think of the World Organization, by Robert A. Graham, S.J., with the collaboration of William L. Lucey, S.J., and James L. Burke, S.J. New York, America Press, 1945. 25 cents

This useful, readable booklet contains the text of the Bishops' Statement on International Order, and a study analysis of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals with interesting comment.

Report on the Russians, by William L. White. New York, Harcourt Brace, 1945. \$2.50

A gifted American writer who knows little of Russia's past history or present problems vividly presents his gloomy impressions on a first visit to that country.

A Miniature History of the War Down to the Liberation of Paris, by R.C.K. Ensor. New York, Oxford University Press, 1945. \$1.50


Multum in parvo aptly describes this concisely but comprehensively written little book.

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Washington News Letter



PROTECTIONISTS FIGHT EXTENSION OF TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT

The first test of President Truman's strength with Congress on an issue of foreign affairs will come over the current bill extending the Trade Agreements Act and authorizing the executive branch of the government to reduce tariffs 75 per cent below their 1934 levels instead of the 50 per cent which present legislation permits. Opposition to the further reduction is powerful, and most observers will not be surprised if the bill is defeated.

PROTECTION PHILOSOPHY STRONG. The chief opposition comes from those industries which lost half their tariff protection in the trade agreements negotiated after the bill first passed in 1934 and who now fear the loss of another 25 per cent. In this group fall textiles, nonferrous metals (lead and zinc), watches, pottery and hand-made glass. Wool-growers, protectionists for many years, also oppose extension. Some of the industries are concerned not simply with the prospective tariff loss but with the entrance into the American market of foreign products—especially watches—during the war, when the output of most ordinary manufactured materials was severely restricted in the United States.

An argument frequently used by opponents of extension concerns the disparity in world labor standards, which has recently been raised by Emil Rieve, general president of the Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, in his pamphlet *International Labor Standards, A Key to World Security*. "In the United States," Mr. Rieve says, "the right of the industry of one state to trade outside its own borders is dependent upon the observance of a Fair Labor Standards Act. The principles underlying this act must become the cornerstone of international relations." It is a new concept that, to move freely in commerce, goods from abroad should be made under the same minimum labor standards as similar goods in the country of consumption. Representative Knutson, Republican of Minnesota, on April 18 elicited the views of Assistant Secretary of State Clayton on "cheap foreign labor," and received this reply: "It is my firm conviction that in practically every field this country's manufacturers and workers are so far ahead in efficiency of those in any other part of the world that even a 50 per cent higher wage cost here can have no effect on our over-all production costs."

The chances for protectionists to "hold their line" are so much brighter in 1945 than they were in 1934, or in the other years when Congress extended the

Act—1937, 1940, 1943—that the American Tariff League has taken on new vitality to stir up opposition to extension of the Trade Agreements Act. The prospects of passage would be bright if the Administration were to withdraw the 25 per cent reduction feature, but that would defeat the goal set on April 18 by former Secretary of State Cordell Hull, first sponsor of the Act. "As President Roosevelt pointed out in his message to Congress on March 26, 1945, we cannot in the difficult period immediately ahead have an effective trade agreements program unless the Act is strengthened and brought up to date," Mr. Hull wrote to Chairman Robert L. Doughton of the House Ways and Means Committee. The trade agreements program has served to reduce not only American tariffs but commerce barriers of foreign countries, because it makes possible a bargaining process in which barrier is reduced for barrier. The Administration fears that it has exhausted most of its bargaining power by reductions already made.

UNITED STATES EXPORT PROGRAM. The struggle between the forces favoring the Tariff League and the Hull points of view will probably be decided in the Senate. The Administration is confident that the House will pass the bill, despite the slow progress of the hearings before the Ways and Means Committee which opened on April 16. The present Act expires on June 12, but failure to enact extension by that date would not jeopardize the program, for the Administration has no intention of negotiating trade agreements while the Pacific war is still in progress and the rehabilitation of European countries has yet to begin.

Administration spokesmen relate the tariff issue to the problem of full employment in the United States and abroad after the war. Fred M. Vinson, Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion, told the House Ways and Means Committee on April 25 that the United States will need to import at least \$6,000,000,000 to \$8,000,000,000 worth of goods every year after the war to balance the increased export trade which he considers will be necessary to provide adequate employment. Secretary of State Stettinius on April 18 termed the trade agreements extension program an integral part of the government's peace planning. Another aspect is the Bretton Woods program, which may shortly be debated by the House of Representatives.

BLAIR BOLLES

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